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Abstract
We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the
unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative
in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle
II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is
because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which
can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: Risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with
low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum
leverage. No one prefers Basle II.
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1. Introduction
The recent crash in home and mortgage prices, and the en-
suing global recession, has brought forth numerous proposals
for the regulation of leverage. The trouble is that many of these
proposals ignore the mechanism of the leverage cycle, and thus
might unwittingly do more harm than good.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of assets held to wealth. A
homeowner who buys a house for $100 by putting down $20
of cash and borrowing the rest is leveraged 5 to 1. One rea-
son leverage is important is that it measures how sensitive the
investor is to a change in asset prices. In the case of the home-
owner, a $1 or 1% decline in the house price represents a 5%
loss in his wealth, since after he sells the house and repays the
$80 loan he will only have $19 out of his original $20 of capi-
tal. Limiting leverage therefore seems to protect investors from
themselves, by limiting how much they can all lose from a 1%
fall in asset prices. Basle II1 effectively puts leverage limits,
through rules for eligible financial collateral, on loans banks
can give to investors, and furthermore it ties the leverage re-
striction to the volatility of asset prices: if asset prices become
more likely to change by 2% instead of 1%, then Basle II cur-
tails leverage even more. At first glance this seems like good
common sense.
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Basle III.
The leverage cycle, however, does not arise from a once and
for all exogenous shock to asset prices, whose damages to in-
vestors can be limited by curtailing leverage. On the contrary,
the leverage cycle is a process crucially depending on the het-
erogeneity of investors. Some investors are more optimistic
than others, or more willing to leverage and buy than others.
When the market is doing well these investors will do well and
via their increased relative wealth and their superior adventur-
ousness, a relatively small group of them will come to hold a
disproportionate share of the assets. When the market is con-
trolled by a smaller group of agents who are more homogeneous
than the market as a whole, their commonality of outlook will
tend to reduce the volatility of asset prices. But this will enable
them, according to the Basle II rules, to leverage more, which
will give them a still more disproportionate share of the assets,
and reduce volatility still further. Despite the leverage restric-
tions intended from Basle II, the extremely low volatility still
gives room for very high leverage.
At this point some exogenous bad luck that directly reduces
asset prices will have a disproportionate effect on the wealth of
the most adventurous buyers. Of course they will regard the
situation as an even greater buying opportunity, but in order to
maintain even their prior leverage levels they will be forced to
sell instead of buying. At this point volatility will rise and the
Basle II lending rules will force them to reduce leverage and
sell more. The next class of buyers will also not be able to
buy much because their access to leverage will also suddenly
be curtailed. The assets will cascade down to a less and less
willing group of buyers. In the end, the price of the assets will
fall not so much because of the exogenous shock, but because
the marginal buyer will be so different from what he had been
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before the shock. Thus we shall show that in some conditions,
Basle II not only would fail to stop the leverage build up, but
it would make the deleveraging crash much worse by curtailing
all the willing buyers simultaneously. The policy itself creates
systemic risk.
We shall also see that another apparently sensible regulation
can lead to disaster. Common sense suggests it would be safer
if the banks required funds to hedge their positions enough to
guarantee they can pay their debts before they could get loans.
The trouble with this idea is that when things are going well, the
most adventurous leveragers will again grow, thereby lowering
volatility. This lower volatility will reduce their hedging costs,
and enable them to grow still faster and dominate the market,
reducing volatility and hedging costs still more. Bad luck will
then disproportionately reduce the wealth of the most enthusi-
astic buyers. But more importantly, it will increase volatility
and thus hedging costs. This will force further selling by the
most enthusiastic buyers, and limit the buying power of the next
classes of potential owners. In just the same way as Basle II, the
effort to impose common sense regulation of leverage can cre-
ate bigger crashes.
In recent years a variety of studies including Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2010), Adrian and Shin.
(2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Thurner et al.
(2012), and Caccioli et al. (2012) have made it clear that
deleveraging can cause systemic financial instabilities leading
to market failure, as originally discussed by Minsky (1992).
The specific problem is that regulatory action can cause syn-
chronized selling, thereby amplifying or even creating large
downward price movements. In order to stabilize markets a
variety of new regulatory measures have been proposed to sup-
press such behavior. But do these measures really address the
problem?
In this paper we focus on the systemic risk component of
overlapping portfolios. By systemic risk here we mean the de-
fault of financial institutions generated by the internal dynamics
of the financial system. Such defaults are typically synchro-
nized and in more serious cases involve the default of a sub-
stantial number of agents. Our example here is simple, as there
is only one risky asset. Contagion is transmitted between agents
when they buy or sell the asset, and as we will see, the use of
leverage can lead to market crises. A key point in this study is
that crises emerge endogenously, under normal operation of the
model – there are long periods where the market is relatively
quiet, but due to the build up of leverage, the market becomes
more sensitive to small fluctuations (which would at other times
have negligible effect).
Of particular interest here are leverage constraints, which are
a significant part of financial regulation. These constraints are
implemented in numerous ways, most influential in the form of
capital adequacy rules in the Basle II framework and as margin
requirements and debt limits in the Regulations T, U, and X of
the Federal Reserve System. Margin requirements were estab-
lished in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash with the be-
lief that margin loans led to risky investments resulting in losses
for lenders (Fortune, 2000). Fortune (2001) discusses the reg-
ulation, historical background, accounting mechanics and eco-
nomic principles of margin lending according to Regulations T,
U, and X.
In comparison to straightforward leverage constraints, the
Basle II capital adequacy rules classify and weight assets of
banks according to credit risk. Banks regulated under the Basle
II framework are required to hold capital equal to 8% of risk-
weighted assets. A recent case study of the Bank of Canada
discusses unweighted leverage constraints as a supplement to
existing risk-weighted capital requirements (Bordeleau et al.,
2009). The second of the Basle II Accords (Basle II) capital
adequacy regulations added a significant amount of complexity
and sophistication to the calculation of risk-weighted assets. In
particular, banks are encouraged to use internal models, such
as value-at-risk (VaR), to determine the value of risk-weighted
assets according to internal estimations. In a nontechnical anal-
yses of the Basle II rules, Balin (2008) provides an easy acces-
sible analysis of both the Basle I and Basle II framework.
Lo and Brennan (2012) provide an extensive overview of
leverage constraints, pointing out that regulatory constraints on
leverage are generally fixed limits that do not vary over time
or with changing market conditions, and suggest that from a
microprudential perspective fixed leverage constraints result in
large variations in the level of risk. Recent studies of central
banks also conclude that current regulatory leverage constraints
are inadequate (Bhattacharya et al., 2011; Christensen et al.,
2011). From a macroprudential perspective internal estimations
of banks appear to be cyclically biased in determining the value
of risk-weighted assets, contributing to a procyclical increase in
global leverage (Bordeleau et al., 2009). Keating et al. (2001)
and Danı´elsson (2002) have also argued that the Basle II regu-
lations fail to consider the endogenous component of risk, and
that the internal models of banks can have destabilizing effects,
inducing crashes that would otherwise not occur.
Computational agent-based models have gained popularity
in economic modeling over the last decades and are able to re-
produce some empirical features of financial markets that tradi-
tional approaches cannot replicate(LeBaron, 2008). An advan-
tage of this approach is the ability to implement institutional
features accurately and to be able to simulate any model setup,
without the constraints of analytic tractability. An extensive re-
view of financial multi-agent models can be found in LeBaron
(2006) and Hommes (2006). LeBaron (2006) has focused more
on models with many types of agents and Hommes (2006) con-
centrating more on models with a few types of agents and the
effects of heterogeneous strategies.
In this paper we use an agent-based financial market model
introduced by Thurner et al. (2012) to test the performance of
several credit regulation policies. The model introduced by
Thurner et al. (2012) will be used as a baseline. In this work,
the model is extended to allow short selling and to incorporate
different regulation policies. The use of this simulation model
allows us to explicitly implement and test any given regulatory
policy. We test three different cases: (1) An unregulated mar-
ket, (2) the Basle II framework and (3) a hypothetical regula-
tory policy in which banks completely hedge against possible
losses from providing leverage (while charging their clients the
hedging costs). We find that when leverage is high both of the
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regulatory schemes fail to guard against systemic financial in-
stabilities, and in fact result in even higher rates of default than
no regulation at all. The reason for this is that both regulatory
policies compel investors to deleverage just when this is desta-
bilizing, triggering failures when they would otherwise not oc-
cur.
Agent-based models have often been criticized for making
arbitrary assumptions, particularly concerning agent decision
making. We address this problem here by keeping the model
simple and making a minimum of behavioral assumptions.
There are four types of investors:
1. Fund managers are perfectly informed value investors that
all see the same perfect valuation signal. They buy when
the market is underpriced and sell when it is overpriced.
Fund managers are risk-neutral.
2. Noise traders are inattentive value investors. They buy or
sell when the market is under or over priced, but do so
less efficiently than the fund managers. Noise traders are
risk-neutral.
3. Banks loan money to the fund managers to allow them
to leverage. Banks are risk-averse, though the extent
to which this is true differs depending on the regulator
scheme.
4. Fund investors place or withdraw money from the fund
managers based on a historical average of each fund’s per-
formance.
The fund managers, which are the primary focus of this arti-
cle, are heterogeneous agents, i.e. there are multiple funds with
different levels of aggression. In contrast, the other three types
are representative agents, i.e. there is a single noise trader, a
single bank, and a single fund investor. The primary function
of the noise traders is to provide a background price series to
generate opportunities for the fund investor; the function of the
fund investors is to guarantee that the price dynamics can be run
in a steady state without the fund managers becoming infinitely
wealthy. The bank is there to lend money to the funds, but it
is a backdrop – the bank is infinitely solvent. (It is nonetheless
useful to examine welfare measures, such as the losses to the
bank, rate of default on loans, etc.)
The postulated behaviors of each type of agent are reason-
ably generic, and in some cases, such as for the banks, we are
merely codifying behaviors that are essentially mechanical and
legally mandated by the terms of contractual agreement or reg-
ulation. Most importantly, our results are relatively insensitive
to assumptions. The fact that this is a simulation model has the
important advantage of allowing us to quantitatively and ex-
plicitly evaluate any regulatory scheme. This model is useful
because it can incorporate more realism than a typical stylized
equilibrium model (Bouchaud, 2008; Farmer and Foley, 2009;
Lux and Westerhoff, 2009; Thurner, 2011). This joins a grow-
ing class of agent-based models for testing economic policies
that attempt quantifiable, reproducible and falsifiable results,
whose parameters are – at least in principle – observable in re-
ality. Recent studies that use agent-based models for testing
economic policies include Demary (2008), Haber (2008),West-
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Figure 1: Schematic structure of the model: Fund managers buy a single risky
asset when it is underpriced and sell when it is overpriced. Noise traders also
buy or sell when the market is under or over priced, but do so less efficiently
than the fund managers – the noise traders and fund managers have the same no-
tion of value. A representative bank loans money to the fund managers to allow
them to leverage. In the Basle II, and the perfect-hedge scheme fund managers
pay fees for receiving loans, see Eqs. (27) and (28). Investors place or withdraw
money from the funds based on their historical performance. Funds are hetero-
geneous based on the aggression of their investment strategy; more aggressive
funds tend to use more leverage. For fund manager profits see figure 8(c). In the
model no actual fees are paid. The plot corresponds to a hypothetical situation,
which is certainly correct for small hedge funds.
erhoff (2008); Westerhoff and Franke (2012), Kerbl (2010) and
Hermsen (2010).
In Section 2, following Thurner et al. (2012) we present the
model that serves as the baseline for comparison of regulatory
schemes. In Section 3 the modifications necessary to imple-
ment the regulatory measures are explained. Section 4 presents
simulation results comparing both the Basle II-type regulation
and the full perfect-hedge regulation schemes under various
leverage levels in the financial system. In Section 5 we con-
clude, discussing why Basle II-type systems – even in their
most ideal form – destabilize the market just when stability is
most needed, i.e. in times of high leverage levels in the sys-
tem. At the heart of this problem are synchronization effects of
financial agents in time of stress.
2. The baseline model
The baseline model represents a market that is unregulated
except for a maximum leverage requirement. It is an agent-
based model with four different types of agents as described
in Thurner et al. (2012). There is only a single asset, without
dividends and consumption, and investors are given a choice
between holding the asset or holding cash. Prices are formed
via market clearing. In the subsequent paragraphs we give an
overview of each type of agent, and then in the remainder of
this section we describe their behavior in more detail.
In figure 1 we show a schematic structure of the model. The
first type of agents are fund managers, e.g. hedge funds or pro-
prietary trading groups. They are value investors who ‘buy low
and sell high’. They use a strategy that translates a mispricing
signal into taking a long position (buying a positive quantity of
the asset) when the asset price p(t) at time t is below a perceived
fundamental value V . We generalize the model of Thurner et
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al. by also allowing them them to take a short position when
the asset is over-priced, i.e. one for p(t) > V . The demand
of fund managers is denoted by Dh(t), where the subscript h
refers to the fund manager. The fund managers are heteroge-
neous agents who differ in the aggressiveness with which they
respond to buy and sell signals.
The second type of agent is a representative noise trader.
This agent can be thought of as a weakly informed value in-
vestor, who has only a vague concept of the fundamental price,
and thus buys and sells nearly at random, with just a small pref-
erence that makes the price weakly mean-revert around V . The
demand of noise traders at time t is Dn(t). The noise trader is a
representative agent, representing the pool of weakly-informed
investors that cause prices to revert toward value.
The third type of agent is a bank. Fund managers can in-
crease the size of their long positions by borrowing from the
bank by using the asset as collateral. The bank limits lending
so that the value of the loan is always (substantially) less than
the current price of the assets held as collateral. This limit is
called a minimum margin requirement. In case the asset value
decreases so much that the minimum margin requirement is no
longer sustained, the bank issues a margin call and the fund
managers who are affected must sell assets to pay back their
loans in order to maintain minimum margin requirements. This
happens within a single timestep in the model. This kind of
transaction is called margin trading and has the effect of ampli-
fying any profit or loss from trading. If large price jumps occur
and fund managers cannot repay the loan even by selling their
complete portfolio, they default. In the baseline model, for sim-
plicity interest rates for loans are fixed to zero and the bank sets
a fixed minimum margin requirement, denoted by λmax.
The fourth type of agent is a representative fund investorwho
places or withdraws money from a fund according to perfor-
mance. This agent should be viewed as a representative agent
characterizing all investors, both private and institutional, who
place money with funds that use leverage. The amount invested
or redeemed depends on recent historical performance of each
fund compared to a fixed benchmark return rb. Successful fund
managers attract additional capital, unsuccessful ones lose cap-
ital.
2.1. Price formation
At each timestep t asset prices p(t) are formed via market
clearing by equating the sum over the demand of the fund man-
agers Dh(t) and the noise traders Dn(t) to the fixed total supply
N of the asset, which represents the number of issued shares.
The market clearing condition is
Dn(t) +
∑
h
Dh(t) = N. (1)
At every timestep the fund managers must decide how much
of their total wealth Wh(t) they are going to invest. The wealth
of a fund manager is the sum of her cash position Mh(t) and the
current (dollar) value of the asset Dh(t)p(t),
Wh(t) = Dh(t)p(t) + Mh(t). (2)
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Figure 2: Demand function Dh(t)p(t) of a fund manager as a function of the
mispricing signal m(t) = V − p(t). If the asset is underpriced the fund manager
starts buying more and more assets as the price decreases, until the maximum
margin requirement (leverage limit) is hit at m = mcrit. Above this mispric-
ing the demand remains flat. If short selling is banned (dashed line) the fund
manager holds no assets if the asset is overpriced, whereas when short selling
is allowed (solid line) the fund manager takes a negative position on the asset
when it is overpriced.
When a fund manager borrows cash for leveraging positions,
the cash Mh(t) is negative, representing the fact that she has
spent all her money and is in debt to the bank. Leverage λh is
defined as the ratio between the fund manager’s portfolio value
and her wealth,
λh(t) =
Dh(t)p(t)
Wh(t)
=
Dh(t)p(t)
Dh(t)p(t) + Mh(t)
. (3)
In case of short selling leverage is defined as the ratio of the
asset side in the balance sheet and the wealth,
λh(t) =
Wh(t) − Dh(t)p(t)
Wh(t)
=
Mh(t)
Dh(t)p(t) + Mh(t)
. (4)
The fund managers are value investors who base their de-
mand Dh(t) on a mispricing signal, m(t) = V − p(t). For sim-
plicity the perceived fundamental value V is fixed at a con-
stant value, which is the same for all fund managers and noise
traders. Figure 2 shows demand Dh(t) for a fund manager h as
a function of the perceived mispricing. As the mispricing in-
creases, the fund manager wants a linear increase of the value
of the portfolio, Dh(t)p(t). However, this is bounded when
it reaches the maximum leverage level λmax, set by the bank.
Fund managers differ in their aggression parameter βh, which
quantifies how strongly they respond to the mispricing signal
m(t). When short selling is allowed2, the fund manager’s de-
mand function, Dh(t) = Dh(t, p(t)), can be written as
Dh(t) =

(1 − λmax)Wh(t)/p(t) if m(t) ≤ mshortcrit
λmaxWh(t)/p(t) if m(t) > m
long
crit
βhm(t)Wh(t)/p(t) otherwise.
(5)
2If short selling is not allowed mshort
crit
= 0 and in the first line Dh(t) = 0. See
Kerbl (2010): p. 6 for fund manager’s demand when short selling is allowed.
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The parameter mcrit > 0 is the critical value of the mispricing
signal above which the fund manager is forced to flatten de-
mand when short selling is not allowed, and similarlymshort
crit
< 0
and m
long
crit
> 0 are the corresponding parameters when short
selling is allowed. Notice that λmax > 1 is strictly required for
short-selling.
To summarize, consider the case where short selling is al-
lowed. When the asset is strongly overpriced the value of the
fund manager’s position is constant at the value Dh(t)p(t) =
(1 − λmax)Wh(t). Similarly when the asset is strongly under-
priced the value is constant at λmaxWh(t). Anywhere in between
the value is βhm(t)Wh(t), i.e. it is proportional to the aggression
parameter βh, the mispricing m(t), the wealthWh(t).
Every fund manager is required by the bank to maintain
λh(t) ≤ λmax. If this condition would be violated the fund man-
ager must adjust her demand to buy or sell assets to ensure that
such a violation does not happen. This is known as meeting a
margin call. The cause of a margin call can be either because
the price drops from p(t − 1) to p(t), causing Wh(t) to fall by a
larger percentage than the asset price (because of leverage), or
because the wealth drops from Wh(t − 1) to Wh(t) due to with-
drawals (redemptions) from investors, as will be discussed be-
low. Fund managers adjust their positions within each timestep
to make sure that this condition is never violated.
The noise trader demand is formulated in terms of the
value ξn(t) = Dn(t)p(t), whose logarithm follows an Ornstein–
Uhlenbeck random process of the form
log ξn(t) = ρ log ξn(t − 1) + σnχ(t) + (1 − ρ) log(VN), (6)
where χ is independent and normally distributed with mean
zero and standard deviation one, and where 0 < ρ < 1.
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a widely used approach to
model currency exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity
prices stochastically. In the limit as ρ → 1, i.e. without the
mean reversion, the log-returns r(t) = log p(t + 1) − log p(t)
of the asset price are normally distributed. We choose a value
of ρ close to one so that without fund managers the price is
weakly mean reverting around the fundamental value V and the
log-returns are nearly normally distributed.
2.2. Defaults
If the fund manager’s wealth ever becomes negative, i.e. if
Wh(t) < 0, the fund manager defaults and goes out of business.
The fund manager must then sell all assets (Dh(t) = 0) and use
the revenue to pay off as much of the loan as possible. All
remaining loss is born by the bank, causing capital shortfall,
which has to be provided by the government or a bailout fund.
For simplicity we assume banks always receive the necessary
bailout funds and they continue to lend to other fund managers
as before. Tre−intro timesteps later the defaulting fund manager
re-emerges as a new fund manager, as described below.
2.3. Wealth dynamics of the fund managers
Initially each fund manager has the same endowment,
Wh(0) = W0. The wealth of the fund manager then evolves
according to
Wh(t) = Wh(t − 1) + Dh(t − 1)[p(t) − p(t − 1)] + Fh(t), (7)
whereDh(t−1)[p(t)−p(t−1)] reflects the profits and losses from
trading of the fund manager’s portfolio and Fh(t) quantifies the
deposits or withdrawals of the fund investor (see the Appendix).
The fund investor deposits or withdraws from each fundman-
ager based on an exponential moving average of the recent per-
formance with smoothing parameter a. This is measured by the
rate of return in comparison to a benchmark return rb, as de-
scribed in the Appendix. This prevents the wealth of the fund
managers from growing indefinitely, and makes possible well
defined statistical averages for properties such as returns and
volatility. This process is well documented, see e.g. Busse
(2001); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Del Guercio and Tka
(2002); Remolona et al. (1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998). Fund
investors cannot take out more cash than the fund manager has.
In case a fund manager’s wealth falls below a critical thresh-
old, Wcrit, the fund manager goes out of business. This avoids
the possibility of “zombie funds”, which persist for many
timesteps with nearly no wealth and no relevance for the mar-
ket. After Tre−intro timesteps, funds that default are replaced
with a new fund with initial wealthW0 and the same aggression
parameter βh.
3. Implementation of regulatory measures
We now introduce two regulatory policies. The first is the
regulatory measure to reduce credit risk encouraged by the
Basle II framework. The second regulation policy is an alter-
native proposal in which all risk associated with leverage is re-
quired to be perfectly hedged by options.
3.1. Basle II
The Basle II scheme that we employ here models the risk
control policies used by banks regulated under the Basle II
framework. These banks use internal models to determine the
value of their risk-weighted assets. The banks are allowed dis-
cretion in their risk control as long as it is Basle II compliant.
We implement a Basel compliant model that is used in practice
by banks.
3.1.1. Credit exposure
According to the Basle II capital adequacy rules banks have
to allocate capital for their credit exposure. The capital can
be reduced through credit mitigation techniques, such as tak-
ing collateral (e.g. securities or cash) from the counterparty on
the loan. This reduces their net adjusted exposure. However,
to provide a safety margin haircuts are also applied to both the
exposure and the collateral. Haircuts are percentages that are
either added or subtracted depending on the context in order to
provide a safety buffer. In the case of a collateralized loan, in
the absence of haircuts, the net exposure taking the risk mitigat-
ing effect of the collateral into account is E∗ = E− k, where k is
the value of the collateral. However, when haircuts are applied
the value of the raw exposure E is adjusted upward to E(1+He),
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where He ≥ 0 is the haircut on the exposure, and the value of the
collateral k is adjusted downward to k(1−Hcol), where Hcol ≥ 0
is the haircut on the collateral. Thus the net exposure taking the
risk mitigating effect of the collateral into account is3
E∗ = max[0, E(1 + He) − k(1 − Hcol)], (8)
The ‘max’ is present to make sure the exposure is never nega-
tive.
3.1.2. Haircuts
The basic idea is that undervaluing the asset creates a safety
buffer which decreases the likelihood that at some point in the
future the value of the collateral will be insufficient to cover
possible losses. Increasing collateral has the dual effect of de-
creasing the chance that the collateral might be insufficient to
cover future losses, and of decreasing the size of loans when
collateral is in short supply. In general the size of the haircut,
and hence the size of the exposure and collateral, depends on
volatility.
Haircuts can either be standard supervisory haircuts, issued
by regulatory bodies4, or internal estimates of banks. Permis-
sion to use internal estimates is conditional on meeting a set of
minimum standards5. Here we use a simple approach – used
in practice by banks for their own internal estimates satisfying
the Basle II standards – and compute the haircuts H
col
using a
formula that sets a minimum floor on the haircut Hmin with an
additional term that increases with the historical volatility σ(t),
measured in terms of standard deviation of log-returns over τ
time steps. We assume a loan of time duration T and a fixed
cost c. The haircut is given by the formula
Hcol(t) = min
[
max
(
Hmin,Φσ(t)
√
T + c
)
, 1
]
, (9)
where Φ is a confidence interval set by the bank in accordance
with the regulatory body6. The use of the ‘min’ and ‘max’ guar-
antees that the haircut is always in the range Hmin ≤ Hcol ≤ 1.
The choice of a haircut implies a variable maximum leverage
λ
adapt
max (t). Suppose a bank makes a loan of size L to a fund that
pledges the shares of the asset it buys as collateral. Then the
raw exposure is E = L and the value of the shares of the asset
is k. By definition the leverage is
λ
adapt
max (t) =
k
k − E . (10)
Since the exposure is cash no haircut is required and He = 0,
but the collateral is risky, so Hcol > 0. If the net risk mitigated
exposure E∗ = 0, then combining Eqs. (8) and (10) implies
λ
adapt
max (t) =
1
Hcol(t)
. (11)
3See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §147.
4See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §147 for recommendation
on supervisory haircuts, e.g. haircut for equities listed on a recognized ex-
change is 25%.
5See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §156-165 for qualitative
and quantitative standards.
6According to the Basel framework Φ must be chosen such that given a
historical volatility σ(t) the haircut is sufficient in 99% of cases. See Bank for
International Settlements (2006): §156.
For short selling the fund borrows the asset (which is risky)
and gives cash as collateral, so the situation is reversed, and
Hcol = 0 with He > 0. In this case He is set according to Eq. (9)
with He on the lefthand side instead of Hcol, and through similar
logic λ
adapt
max (t) = 1/He(t). This shows explicitly how the haircuts
impose a limit on the maximum leverage. For example if the
haircut is 0.5 the maximum leverage is 2, whereas if the haircut
is 0.1 the maximum leverage is 10.
To make correspondence with the unregulated case we set
Hmin = 1/λmax and Φ = 1/λmaxσb, where σb is a benchmark
volatility that serves as an exogenous parameter. Furthermore,
for simplicity we set transaction costs to zero, i.e. c = 0, and
the holding duration of the collateral to one timestep, T = 1.
Then by combining Eqs. (9) and (11) we see that the adaptive
maximum leverage explicitly depends on volatility,
λ
adapt
max (t) = max
[
λmaxmin
(
1,
σb
σ(t)
)
, 1
]
. (12)
If the historical volatility σ(t) ≤ σb then full maximum lever-
age λmax can be used by the fund managers. When the sim-
ulation is operating under the Basle II scheme the λmax in the
fund manager’s demand of equation (5) is replaced by λ
adapt
max (t)
in equation (12).
3.1.3. Spreads
To determine interest rates on loans to fund managers, banks
add a risk premium (spread) S to a benchmark interest rate ib.
Usually S is determined by rating a customer, but in many cases
such as margin trading a fixed risk premium is used for all cus-
tomers of a given type. We use a fixed spread S for all fund
managers. The interest rate for the fund manager h is
ih = ib + S . (13)
To implement borrowing costs in the agent-based model we set
the benchmark interest rate ib = 0 and add a term accounting
for the spread S to equation (7). Fund managers always pay the
borrowing costs for the previous timestep. The details of the
accounting are given in the appendix. Obligations to banks are
satisfied before those of investors, as is the usual practice.
3.2. The perfect-hedge scheme
The idea behind the perfect-hedge scheme is that, in addition
to holding the shares of the asset as collateral, banks require
all loans to be hedged by options. Thus barring default of the
issuer of the option, the loan is completely secure.
3.2.1. Hedging
We first consider the case where the fund is long, in which
case the bank requires it to buy a put with strike price Kput. For
simplicity we treat the loan as an overnight loan and thus the
put has a maturity of one day. To make sure that the loan can
be repaid, the value of the asset must equal the value of the
loan. If the price of the asset when the loan is made is p(t),
from Eq. (10) the fraction by which it can drop in price before
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the value of the collateral is less than that of the original loan is
(k − E)/E = 1/λh(t). The strike price is thus
Kput(t) = p(t)
(
1 − 1
λh(t)
)
, (14)
and via similar reasoning, in the case where the fund is short it
buys a call option with strike price
Kcall(t) = p(t)
(
1 +
1
λh(t) − 1
)
. (15)
Option prices are assumed to obey the Black-Scholes for-
mula (Black and Scholes, 1973). The option price is calculated
based the following parameters: The spot price of the underly-
ing asset is p(t), the risk-free interest rate r = 0, and the volatil-
ity σ = θσ(t), where σ(t) is the historical volatility7. When the
fund is long the strike price Ph of the put option is K = Kput
and when it is short the strike priceCh of the call option is Kcall.
Note that the option prices depend on the leverage through the
strike prices; as the leverage increases the options get closer to
be in the money and so their price increases.
To implement the hedging costs in the model we add a term
for the option costs to equation (7). In case the fund manager
holds a long position whose hedging cost is Ph(t)Dh(t− 1). The
details of the accounting are given in the Appendix. Note that
under this scheme the only risk for the bank is that in case the
fund defaults, it will not be able to pay for the hedging costs
Ph(t − 1) at the previous timestep.
To make a correspondence to the spreads defined under the
Basle II agreement, the effective spreads are8
S
[long]
h
(t) =
Ph(t)
p(t)
(
1 − 1
λh(t)
) and S [short]
h
(t) =
Ch(t)
p(t)
.
(17)
3.2.2. Limit on hedging costs and maximum leverage
Absent any other constraints, under the above scheme there
is the possibility that the maximum leverage could become ar-
bitrarily large, and consequently the hedging costs could be-
come very high. We prevent this by limiting leverage. To
compute the limit on leverage needed to keep the hedging cost
below a given threshold, for long positions we impose a max-
imum hedging cost Pmax. The corresponding dynamic maxi-
mum leverage λ
hedge
max (t) can then be found by solving
P(p(t), σ(t), λ
hedge
max (t)) = Pmax(t), (18)
7We use the historical volatility σ(t), defined as the standard deviation of
the log-returns of the underlying asset over τ timesteps. Volatility is multiplied
by an arbitrary factor θ to gauge the length of one timestep. In the simulations
we set θ = 5
8To see this, note that Dh(t)Ph(t) or Dh(t)Ch(t) is the effective interest the
funds have to pay for being long or short, respectively. To calculate an interest
rate we divide the interest by the loan size, i.e.
Dh(t)Ph(t)
Dh(t)p(t) −Wh(t)
=
Dh(t)Ph(t)
−Mh(t)
. (16)
Note that Mh(t) is negative because the fund owes cash to the bank. By substi-
tuting Wh(t) = Dh(t)p(t)/λh(t) in Eq. (16) we obtain Eq. (17). In case of short
selling the interest rate divided by the loan size is (Dh(t)Ch(t))/(Dh(t)p(t)) =
Ch(t)/ph(t).
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Figure 3: Maximum leverage function λ
adapt
max (t) for fund managers as a function
of historical volatility σ(t) for the two regulation schemes. The dashed red
curve shows the Basle II scheme of equation (12), the solid blue curve shows
the perfect-hedge scheme of equation (20).
for λ
hedge
max (t). Similarly, just as in the Basle II scheme, there is
the possibility that historical volatility (Eq. (17)) could become
arbitrarily low. To prevent this we solve the same equation as-
suming a fixed volatility floor σb, which gives the maximum
leverage as the solution of
P(p(t), σb, λmax) = Pmax(t), (19)
for λmax. Finally, the leverage maximum λ
adapt
max (t) is their mini-
mum, i.e.
λ
adapt
max (t) = min
[
λmax, λ
hedge
max (t)
]
. (20)
The perfect-hedge version of the agent-based model is obtained
by replacing the maximum leverage of equation (5) by equation
(20). Analogous equations hold for the short selling scenario.
See figure 3 for the dependence of λ
adapt
max (t) as a function of σ(t).
4. Results
4.1. Performance and efficiency indicators
As performance indicators we use return to fund investors,
profits to the fund managers, and probability of default. Since
the fund investor actively invests and withdraws money from
fund managers and funds have to cover for expenses, i.e. inter-
est payments, the rate of return rh(t) does not properly capture
the actual return to fund investors. To solve this accounting
problem we compute the adjusted rate of return rad j to fund in-
vestors for any given period from t = 0 to t = T . This is done
by adjusting the wealthWh(t) of fund managers by the net flow
of capital and the expenses within a given period, according to
r
ad j
h
(T ) =
W
ad j
h
(T )
Wh(0)
− 1 (21)
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with
W
ad j
h
(T ) = Wh(T ) −
T∑
i=0
Fh(i) + f (T ), (22)
where f is an adjustment for the expenses of the fund manager
in a given period, as detailed in the Appendix. If a fundmanager
is out of business at t = T ,Wh(T ) is set to zero and r
ad j
h
(T ) will
be close to −1, deviations coming from the net flow of capital
and expenses of the fund manager in the given period.
For management fees we use a hypothetical 2% fixed fee for
assets under management and a 20% performance fee, paid by
the fund investor to the fund managers. These fees are hypo-
thetical and are not used as actual transactions in the model.
They are only to indicate the profitability of fund managers un-
der various conditions. If a fund manager goes out of business
management fees are not paid.
We also consider the average annualized cost of capital,
which is the effective interest rate ih(t) from equation (13) and
(17). By annualized we mean that one simulation timestep rep-
resents five trading days and one year has 250 trading days. As
performance indicators we monitor the standard deviation of
the log-returns r(t) for all timesteps from an entire simulation
run as an asset volatility ‘index’. Additionally we calculated
the distortion as defined in Westerhoff and Franke (2012), i.e.
the average absolute distance between log price and log funda-
mental V . Note that in our case the distortion is closely related
to volatility. We explicitly checked that the distortion closely
follows the curves of figure 7(a). As a measure for trading vol-
ume we use the average number of shares traded per timestep,
1/HT
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 |Dh(t) − Dh(t − 1)|, with T denoting the num-
ber of timesteps in a simulation run and the number of fund
managers H = 10. Finally, we measure the capital shortfall of
banks by just keeping track of the amount of money they lose
when funds default.
4.2. Model Calibration: Choice of Parameters
For all simulations we used 10 fund managers with βh =
5, 10, . . . , 50, and simulation parameters ρ = 0.99, σn = 0.035,
V = 1, N = 1 × 109, rb = 0.003, a = 0.1, b = 0.15,
W0 = 2 × 106, Wcrit = 2 × 105, Tre−intro = 100, τ = 10, θ = 5,
σb = 0.01175 and S = 0.00015. For most runs we used a range
of λmax ∈ [1, ..., 20].
To test the robustness of the model we tested several different
parameter sets, varied key parameters and motivated parame-
ter choices in their economic context. A complete analysis of
the robustness of the model is not feasible because of the large
number of parameters, and because several parameters cannot
be set independently.
Reducing or increasing the number of fund managers H af-
fects the wealth Wh(t) of individual fund managers. With more
fund managers individual banks accumulate less wealth. There-
fore individual bankruptcies of fund managers become less se-
vere resulting in lower capital shortfall for banks. Increasing the
aggressiveness of fund managers βh causes them to react more
to mispricing, resulting in more margin calls and subsequent
defaults.
The parameters ρ, σn, V , N determine the demand of noise
traders. σn is set to reflect typical stock price fluctuations. N, V
and W0 are chosen to guarantee that fund managers have a low
market share when they are introduced in market. We choose
to arbitrarily set V = 1 and choose N and W0 accordingly. The
setting of ρ ∼ 1 ensures that the deviation from the normal
distribution is minimal. With ρ = 0.99 the typical fluctuation in
volatility is about 1%, which is a reasonable volume given real
stock values.
The benchmark return rb plays the important role of deter-
mining the relative size of hedge funds vs. noise traders. If the
benchmark return is set very low then funds will become very
wealthy and will buy a large quantity of the asset under even
small mispricings, preventing the mispricing from ever grow-
ing large. This effectively induces a hard floor on prices. If
the benchmark return is set very high, funds accumulate little
wealth and play a negligible role in price formation. The inter-
esting behavior is observed at intermediate values of rb where
the funds’ demand is comparable to that of the noise traders.
The parameter ”a ” governs the exponential moving average
of the performance of fund managers and the parameter ”b”
controls the sensitivity of withdrawals or contributions of fund
investors. Both parameters a and b are set empirically, fol-
lowing work from Busse (2001),Chevalier and Ellison (1997),
Del Guercio and Tka (2002), Remolona et al. (1997) and Sirri
and Tufano (1998).
Using a positive survival threshold for removing funds Wcrit
avoids the creation of zombie funds that persist for long periods
of time with almost no wealth. Setting Tre−intro = 100, which
controls the reintroduction of funds after bankruptcies, corre-
sponds to 2 years under the calibration that one timestep is five
days, which we think is a reasonable value. Higher settings for
Tre−intro result in simulations with few fund managers present at
turbulent times.
The parameter τ is chosen to measure historical volatility
over a short window. Choosing different windows τ 5 < τ < 20
does not substantially influence the simulations.
The parameter θ is an arbitrary factor that sets the length of
one timestep. We choose to use a calibration in which one
timestep is five days and a year has 250 trading days. This
calibration seems reasonable considering several factors such
as the average rate of return to fund investors, which would be
∼ 8% (for high leverage scenarios, not considering defaults) or
the benchmark rate of return, which would be 15%.
The benchmark volatility σb is set empirically to a very low
volatility that is only reached in tranquil times. Alternatively it
would be possible to refrain from using σb and set Hmin and Φ
or Pmax directly.
The parameter S is a risk premium (spread) to a benchmark
interest rate ib, see above. We use a fixed spread S for all
fund managers of 0.75%. This low risk premium of approxi-
mately 1% reflects the fact that loans are fully collateralized in
the model.
4.3. Returns and correlations
The statistical properties of asset price returns change con-
siderably with increasing leverage. Figure 4 shows the distribu-
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Figure 4: The distribution of log-returns r. (a) Return distributions of the base-
line model (with parameters from subsection 4.2) in semi-log scale. The un-
leveraged case (blue circles) practically matches the case with only noise traders
(blue curve). When the maximum leverage is raised to λmax = 15 (red squares)
the distribution becomes more leptokurtic, and negative returns develop a fat
tail. With short selling (demand equation (5)) the distribution becomes even
thinner and tails turn fat on both sides. (b) Return distributions for the three
regulation schemes at λmax = 15.
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Figure 5: Timeseries for perfect-hedge scheme for 10 fund managers with βh =
5, 10, . . . , 50, for λmax = 15. The simulation was done for the perfect-hedge
scheme with maximum leverage equation (20) and wealth equations (30) and
(31). Simulation parameters are listed in subsection 4.2. (a) Wealth timeseries
Wh(t) of the fund managers. (b) Historical volatilities over a τ = 10 timestep
window. For reference, in a market with noise traders only, the volatility is
about σ(t) ≈ 17.5 percent. For comparison the inset shows the VIX (Chicago
Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index), a measure of the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options from 2004 to 2012. Our model reproduces
the asymmetric profile in which volatility bursts are initiated by a rapid rise
followed by a gradual fall. (c) Timeseries of the asset price p(t).
tion of log-returns r(t) for four cases: (i) For the case of noise
traders only, log-returns are almost normally distributed. (ii)
With un-leveraged fund managers, volatility is slightly reduced
but log-returns remain nearly normally distributed. (iii) When
leverage is increased to λmax = 15 and no short selling is al-
lowed, the distribution becomes thinner for small r(t) but the
negative returns develop fat tails. The asymmetry arises be-
cause with a short selling ban in place fund managers are only
active when the asset is underpriced, i.e. when the mispricing
m(t) > 0. Finally, when short selling is allowed (iv), the distri-
bution becomes yet more concentrated in the center and fat tails
develop on both sides. Due to higher risk involving short sell-
ing, the distribution becomes slightly asymmetric. This higher
short selling risk arises because of the different risk profile of
long and short positions. The potential losses from long posi-
tions are limited, since the price cannot go below zero. This is
not the case for short positions, where the loss potential has no
limit. Note that in all cases the autocorrelation of signed returns
is very small, whereas the autocorrelation of absolute returns is
strongly positive and decays slowly.
4.4. Timeseries
The timeseries shown in figure 5 are computed for the
perfect-hedge scheme when short selling is allowed at λmax =
15. Figure 5(a) shows the wealth Wh(t) for all 10 fund man-
agers over time, figure 5(b) shows the historical asset volatility
and figure 5(c) shows the timeseries of the asset price p(t). The
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leverage cycle can be observed in this figure. Initially, all fund
managers start with Wh(0) = 2 and have a marginal influence
on the market. As they gain more wealth their market impact
increases, mispricings are damped and the asset volatility de-
creases. The decrease in volatility results in lower borrowing
cost for the fund managers. Lower borrowing cost allows them
to use a higher leverage, which further lowers volatility, result-
ing in even lower borrowing costs etc.. This leads to seemingly
stable market conditions with low volatility and low borrowing
costs for fund managers; such stable periods can persist for a
long time. Occasionally the stable periods are interrupted by
crashes. These are triggered by small fluctuations of the noise
trader demand. As shown in Thurner et al. (2012), if one or
more of the funds is at its leverage limit, a downward fluctua-
tion in price causes the leverage to rise. This triggers a margin
call, which forces the fund to sell into a falling market, ampli-
fying the downward fluctuation. This may cause other funds to
sell, driving prices even further down, to cause a crash. Such
crashes can trigger price drops as large as 50%, which cause
the more highly leveraged fund managers to default. After a
crash noise traders dominate and volatility is high. Fund man-
agers are reintroduced; as their wealth grows volatility drops,
and the leverage cycle starts again. In situations where a crash
wipes out all but the least aggressive fund managers, as hap-
pens around t = 29, 000 and at about t = 47, 000, the surviving
less aggressive fund managers become dominant for extended
periods of time.
4.5. Volatility profile
One of the interesting aspects of our model is that it repro-
duces the asymmetric profile of volatility bursts. The inset of
figure 5(b) shows the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market Volatility Index), which is a measure of the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options, from 2004 to 2012. As
can seen by eye in this figure, in our model, as in the real data,
volatility bursts rise rapidly and damp out gradually, forming a
very characteristic asymmetric peak.
To see this more quantitatively in Figure 6 we compare the
peak behaviors of the VIX, our model and a GARCH(1,1)
model. Two example time series around a peak are shown for
each. The data is normalized so that the peaks are all of the
same height. The time axis is shifted so that peaks occur at
t = 500. Otherwise, the time axis is not normalized or gauged to
real time. We fit the rise and decay around the peaks as a power
law of the form σ(t) ∝∼ tk, characterizing the rise by k = k1 and
the decay by k = k2, and take the average for the largest peaks in
the time series, both from the VIX and from our model. To de-
termine which peaks to fit, we selected local maxima that are at
least (max(VIX)−min(VIX))/4) or (max(σ(t))−min(σ(t)))/4)
above the surrounding data. The fitted values for the rise of
the VIX are k1 ∼ 16.39 and for our model k1 ∼ 9.19. The
VIX gradually falls with k2 ∼ −2.34 and for our model with
k2 ∼ −1.18. GARCH models do not exhibit power-law behav-
ior and k1 and k2 cannot be fitted. Note that while the form of
the peaks is the same for the VIX and our model, the magnitude
is not; also the VIX follows the profile with less noise than our
model does. A possible reason for this is that the VIX shows
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Figure 6: Peak behavior of the VIX (a), our model (b) and a GARCH(1,1)
model (c). We find that the rise and fall of volatility during a peak follows
roughly a power law of the form σ(t) ∝∼ tk. The fitted values for the rise of the
VIX are k1 ∼ 16.39 and for our model k1 ∼ 9.19. The VIX gradually falls with
k2 ∼ −2.34 and for our model with k2 ∼ −1.18. GARCH models do not exhibit
power-law behavior, and k1 and k2 can not be fitted. In each case we show two
characteristic time series in blue (solid line) and red (dashed line), normalized
to have the same peak height. The time axis is shifted so that peaks occur at
t = 500. Otherwise, the time axis is not normalized or gauged to real time.
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the implied volatility of S&P 500 index, while our model shows
the volatility of a single asset.
As a further statistical comparison we calculated the stan-
dardized moments skewness and kurtosis. The skewness of the
VIX (∼ 2.02) is virtually identical to our model (∼ 2.01), how-
ever the kurtosis of the VIX (∼ 8.13) is lower compared to our
model (∼ 14.59). Note that the VIX shows even in tranquil
times quite substantial volatility in comparison to our model,
where extended periods with almost no volatility can be ob-
served. The reason for this is that in times of high market share
of the fund managers, the effect on the asset price of the noise
traders is negligible. All fund managers have the same per-
ceived fundamental value V and thus stabilize the asset price
to a point where almost no volatility can be observed. With a
different fundamental value Vh for every fund manager the be-
havior would become less synchronized and therefore, even in
tranquil times, volatility would remain at a substantial level. We
have explicitly checked this in a series of experiments.
4.6. Comparison of regulatory schemes
In the following we illustrate the impacts of the three regula-
tory schemes:
1. The unregulated baseline scheme from section 2 with fixed
maximum leverage λmax, corresponding to demand equa-
tion (5).
2. The Basle II scheme, which has the same demand equation
but with λmax replaced by λ
adapt
max (t) of (12) and the wealth
update given by (27) and (28).
3. The perfect-hedge scheme, where λ
adapt
max (t) is given by (20)
and the wealth update is (30) and (31).
For all simulations we used the parameters listed in subsection
4.2 and enabled short selling. λmax was varied from 1 to 20. For
each parameter set we compute 5 × 104 timesteps and average
over 100 independent runs. The following indicators are annu-
alized using a calibration in which one timestep is five days and
a year has 250 trading days. This calibration seems reasonable
considering several factors such as the average rate of return to
fund investors, which would be ∼ 8% (for high leverage scenar-
ios, not considering defaults) or the benchmark rate of return,
which would be 15%.
Figure 7 provides a panel of results that show how market
characteristics such as (a) price volatility, (b) trading volume,
(c) average leverage and (d) the effective interest rate are af-
fected by the varying the maximum leverage parameter λmax
under each of the three regulatory schemes. For the unregu-
lated case the volatility drops monotonically as λmax increases,
dropping by almost a factor of two for 1 < λmax < 10 and then
reaching a plateau. The reason the volatility drops is that the
presence of value investors ordinarily damps volatility, since
they buy when prices fall and sell when prices rise. Larger
leverage means more trading and it also means higher profits
for a given level of trading, which means investors place more
money in the funds and they have more market power. The re-
sulting increase in trading is evident in Figure 7 (b): Between
λmax = 1 and λmax = 3 the trading volume increases by more
than a factor of three, and then more or less levels off.
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Figure 7: Impacts of regulatory measures on market indicators as λmax varies.
(a) Volatility of the underlying asset. (b) Market volume of the underlying as-
set, measured by the average amount of shares traded by a fund manager per
timestep. (c) Average effective leverage of fund managers (d) Average annual-
ized effective interest rate. For all simulations we used 10 fund managers with
βh = 5, 10, . . . , 50 over 5 × 104 timesteps. Simulation parameters listed in sub-
section 4.2, short selling was allowed. For all indicators it is assumed that one
timestep takes five days and a year has 250 trading days. Blue, green, and red
curves indicate the unregulated, the Basle II, and the perfect-hedge scheme, re-
spectively. Standard deviations computed over 100 independent runs are below
symbol size.11
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Figure 8: Impacts of regulatory measures on performance indicators for the
most aggressive fund manager with βh = 50 as λmax varies. (a) Average annual
probability of fund failure. (b) Average annual adjusted rate of return rad j to
fund investors. (c) Average annual profits to the fund managers. (d) Annual
capital shortfall of banks. For all simulations we used the same setup as in the
previous figure. Standard deviations computed over 100 independent runs are
about 0.01, 0.01, 2.7 × 105 and 5.4 × 105 for (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectively.
Volatility is not significantly influenced by failures of fund
managers. Bankruptcies of the most aggressive fund manager
occur on average every 800 time steps for λmax > 7. Therefore
the subsequent price drops or jumps do not occur frequently
enough to substantially influence volatility.
The behavior of the volatility under the Basle II scheme is
more complicated, as is evident in Figure 7 (a). The volatility
initially rises, reaching a maximum at λmax ≈ 2 and then falls,
although never to the low level of the unregulated case.
The explanation for the initial rise in volatility comes from
the fact that for λmax = 1 there is no short selling possible,
see Eq. (5). In this case there are long-only funds only. As
λmax = 2, funds now also engage in short selling and we ex-
perience an effective regime-shift from a long-only to a long-
and-short model. Note that the average leverage for the Basle
II regime (Fig. 7 (c)) is below 1, meaning that there are often
cases where there is no leverage. In those situations where a
leverage reduction from λ > 1 to λ = 1, fund managers are
forced out of short positions leading to do extra trading activity
(that does not exist for the λmax = 1 case) that slightly raises the
volatility.
The behavior of the perfect hedge scheme is also more com-
plicated; it initially falls until λmax ∼ 10, but then rises again.
The reason for the increase in volatility for large λmax under the
perfect hedge scheme is that for high maximum leverage the ef-
fective borrowing costs are large, as illustrated in Figure 7 (d).
This is also the reason why in this scheme the trading volume
drops for λmax > 10. (See equations (13) and (17)). For the
unregulated case the borrowing costs are zero (since for con-
venience we set the base interest rate to zero), whereas under
the Basle II scheme they are fixed. In the perfect hedge scheme
the costs are near zero for small leverage and then grow sharply
starting at about λmax ≈ 5, and exceed the costs for the Basle II
scheme at about λmax ≈ 12. Thus the perfect hedging scheme
is cheaper than the Basle II scheme for low leverage and more
costly for high leverage.
Figure 7 (c) shows the average effective leverage of fund
managers, defined as
〈λh(t)〉 =
1
HT
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
λh(t).
For the unregulated case, as expected, the average leverage ini-
tially increases as λmax increases. It rises from 〈λh(t)〉 ≈ 0.4
when λmax = 1 to a little less than two when λmax ≈ 5. Sur-
prisingly, however, it then decreases until about λmax ≈ 10,
settling into a plateau for λmax > 10 with 〈λh(t)〉 ≈ 1.5. The
reason for the decrease is the drop in volatility, which means
that there are fewer mis-pricings and less opportunities to use
leverage. The Basle II and perfect hedge schemes behave sim-
ilarly, except that they drop very little after their peaks, which
are reached at larger λmax, and their plateau leverage is higher,
with 〈λh(t)〉 ≈ 2.
Figure 8 shows a variety of diagnostics about market perfor-
mance, including (a) the probability of fund default, (b) return
to investors, (c) profits for fund managers and (d) capital short-
fall of banks.
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Figure 8 (a) shows the average annual probability of de-
fault for the most aggressive fund manager. In the unregulated
scheme the annual probability of default initially grows rapidly,
but then reaches a plateau at λmax ≈ 8. The reason for this is that
under the unregulated scheme the use of leverage is automati-
cally self-limiting due to dropping volatility, as demonstrated
in Figure 7(c). For the Basle II and perfect hedge schemes the
initial rise in defaults is slower, but unlike the unregulated case
the default rate never plateaus, and default exceeds the unregu-
lated scheme for roughly λmax > 11. The reason that there are
more defaults in both regulated schemes is that the maximum
leverage is adjusted dynamically. If the maximum leverage is
suddenly decreased when funds are at their maximum lever-
age, they are forced to sell en masse, and the resulting market
impact can trigger a crash9. In figure 8(b) we show the aver-
age adjusted rate of return rad j to fund investors for the most
aggressive fund manager. The return to fund investors is influ-
enced mainly by three factors: effective leverage, mis-pricing
opportunities and probability of fund default. In each of the
three regulatory schemes the investor returns behave similarly,
initially increasing with λmax, reaching a peak, and then de-
creasing. Under the Basle II and perfect hedge schemes the
peaks come later: For the unregulated scheme the peak is at
λmax ≈ 4, for the perfect hedge scheme it is at λmax ≈ 6, and for
Basle II it is at roughly λmax ≈ 8. The primary reason there is
a peak is the rising default rate10. Another important factor is
decreased volatility, and hence fewer mispricings and lower ef-
fective leverage. For large λmax the perfect hedge case behaves
increasingly poorly due to sky-rocketing borrowing costs (see
Figure 7(d)).
Figure 8(c) shows the fund managers’ profits. We assume
a hypothetical 2% fixed fee for the assets under management
and a 20% performance fee. Profits to funds are consistently
higher in the unregulated scheme than in either of the alterna-
tives. The discrepancy is exaggerated relative to investors’ prof-
its due to the fact that under the unregulated scheme the assets
under management by the funds are much larger. It is perhaps
not surprising that fund managers clearly prefer less regulation.
Surprisingly, as λmax increases from one to two, fund managers’
profits initially drop; for the unregulated case it reaches a min-
imum about 30% less than the unleveraged case, which for the
regulated schemes is almost 75%. The origin of this problem is
the same as mentioned above, that for λmax = 1 it is not possible
to short sell, see Eq. (5). In this case we have long-only funds.
As soon as we bring leverage to λmax = 2, funds engage in short
selling and we have a shift from a long-only to a long-and-short
model. We have explicitly checked this issue by tests, where
we make the demand function for short selling Eq. (5) fully
symmetric to the long-part, by removing the 1 in Eq. (5). In
this case no more drop in the managers’ profits from λmax = 1
to λmax = 2 occurs. Note that this symmetric implementation is
9For λmax < 10 the perfect-hedge scheme performs a bit better than the
Basle II scheme because of the stronger limit to lending based on historical
volatility illustrated in figure 3.
10If funds that have gone bankrupt are excluded the performance reaches a
maximum at λmax ∼ 7.
of course not the correct one. Profits are consistently higher for
the perfect hedge scheme than they are in the Basle II scheme.
Finally, in Figure 8(d) we show the capital shortfall of banks.
As expected the shortfall is the largest for the unregulated case,
and for the perfect hedge case it is zero by definition.
5. Discussion
We studied an agent based model of a financial market where
investors have different degrees of information about the fun-
damental value of financial assets. Fund managers leverage
their investments by borrowing from banks. These speculative
investments based on credit introduce a systemic risk compo-
nent to the system. When the collateral backing the involved
loans are composed of the same financial assets themselves,
the model reproduces the various stages of the leverage cy-
cle, Geanakoplos (1997, 2003); Fostel andGeanakoplos (2008);
Geanakoplos (2010), and the systemic prerequisites leading up
to crashes can be studied in detail, Thurner et al. (2012). In
this work we have studied the role of Basle II-type regulations,
which define the conditions under which banks can provide
leverage. These regulations basically require Banks to apply
haircuts to the collateral accepted, and to take spreads. This
raises the capital costs for the leverage takers, so that they take
less effective leverage than they would in the unregulated case.
We find that this is indeed the case for situations of low lever-
age in the system; regulation makes the system more secure.
On the other hand regulation reduces the market share of fund
managers in general, with the consequence that they take less
volatility from the markets than they would in the unregulated
case. In this sense there is no optimal level of leverage or op-
timal level of regulation. Regulation makes the markets more
secure in the sense that it reduces the frequency of large price
jumps, but renders markets more volatile in general.
The situation changes drastically when the general level of
leverage is high in the system, which is the case for phases of
low-volatility. When the leverage is greater than about 10, in-
vestors in the regulated schemes take more effective leverage
than they would in an unregulated world. This is easy to under-
stand: in the unregulated situation the fund managers become
bigger (in the model up to twice as big in terms of assets un-
der management) and hence reduce volatility more effectively.
In this scenario the regulated system becomes less stable than
the unregulated one, which is for example reflected in a higher
default rate of regulated investors than unregulated ones. Also
the regulated system does not manage to reduce the frequency
of crashes. In terms of capital shortfall of banks, the regulated
system is superior to the unregulated one for all leverage levels
in the system.
We next designed a hypothetical regulation system, where
banks require their investors to hedge against the risk of loss
of collateral value. Under the assumption that the writers of
options never default, by construction the capital shortfall of
banks is zero. This regulation scheme tests the effect of making
the capital costs (effective interest rate) for the fund managers
dependent on the actual leverage taken; capital for higher lever-
age (and thus more systemic risk) is more expensive. This is
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not the case for Basle II-type regulation, where the interest rate
is independent of leverage.
Even under the perfect hedging scheme the system does not
get much safer on a systemic level. The effects are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to the Basle II-type scenario. How-
ever, in terms of volatility reduction the perfect-hedge scheme
is shown to be superior to the Basle II scheme.
We have thus demonstrated that even under the assumption of
a perfect-hedge scheme, systemic risk originates from a source
that is not addressed by present regulation mechanisms. Sys-
temic risk arises due to a synchronization of the agents’ behav-
ior in times of high leverage. Such synchronized behavior can
become worse under regulation. This is because a lowering of
the maximum leverage at a point where some of the funds are
fully leveraged can cause a wave of selling, driving prices down
and triggering even more selling, and in some cases leading to
a crash.
As pointed out in Thurner and Poledna (2013) systemic risk
is not only related to network properties but it is a multiplex
network concept. By this we mean that systemic risk happens
on various layers of the financial system, which can all influ-
ence each other. The networks involved include: borrowing
and lending relationships (which can be further broken down
into explicit contractual obligations, i.e. counterparty expo-
sures, and implicit relationships, such as roll-over of overnight
loans), insurance (derivative) contracts, collateral obligations,
market impact of overlapping asset portfolios and network of
cross-holdings (holding of securities or stocks of fellow banks).
In this paper we do not propose a solution to the problem of
credit regulation. However, our belief is that a key element of
any such regulation should be greater transparency. As argued
in Thurner (2011), one can imagine a system where every credit
provider has to disclose the amount of its loans and the identity
of the borrower on their homepage, and borrowers would have
to disclose their leverage. In this way there would develop a
transparent credit market with emerging lending rates, depend-
ing on the riskiness of the creditor and the borrower. Conse-
quences of such schemes are presently under investigation.
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Appendix on accounting
Fund withdrawals
The detailed accounting formulae for funds flowing in and
out of funds are as follows: Let
rh(t) =
Dh(t − 1)[p(t) − p(t − 1)]
Wh(t − 1)
, (23)
be the rate of return of fund manager h. The fund investors base
their decisions on the recent performance of fund h, measured
as an exponential moving average of the rate of return
r
perf
h
(t) = (1 − a) rperf
h
(t − 1) + a rh(t). (24)
The amount of cash a fund manager would have if selling all
assets at the current price is
M˜h(t) = D(t − 1)p(t) + M(t − 1). (25)
The flow of capital in or out of fund h is given by
Fh(t) = max
[
−1, b
(
r
perf
h
(t) − rb
)]
max
[
0, M˜h(t)
]
, (26)
where b is a parameter controlling the fraction of capital with-
drawn or invested, a is the moving average parameter, and rb is
the benchmark return of the investors.
Spreads under Basle II
In case the fund manager takes a leveraged long position (Mh
is negative) her wealth is
Wh(t) = Wh(t−1)+Dh(t−1)[p(t)− p(t−1)]+Fh(t)+Mh(t−1)S ,
(27)
and in case of short selling, where the demand is negative,
Wh(t) = Wh(t−1)+Dh(t−1)[p(t)−p(t−1)]+Fh(t)+Dh(t−1)p(t−1)S .
(28)
The maximum amount the fund investor can redeem from the
fund manager has to be adjusted from equation (25) to
M˜h(t) = D(t − 1)p(t) + M(t − 1)[1 + S ] [long]
M˜h(t) = D(t − 1)p(t) + M(t − 1) + Dh(t − 1)p(t − 1)S [short].(29)
Hedging costs under the perfect hedging scheme
Under the perfect hedging scheme the wealth becomes
Wh(t) = Wh(t−1)+Dh(t−1)[p(t)−p(t−1)]+Fh(t)−Dh(t−1)Ph(t−1),
(30)
and similarly for short selling
Wh(t) = Wh(t−1)+Dh(t−1)[p(t)−p(t−1)]+Fh(t)+Dh(t−1)Ch(t−1).
(31)
The maximum redemption of fund investors is adjusted for long
positions
M˜h(t) = D(t − 1)p(t) + M(t − 1)) − Dh(t − 1)Ph(t − 1), (32)
and for short selling is
M˜h(t) = D(t − 1)p(t) + M(t − 1)) + Dh(t − 1)Ch(t − 1). (33)
Adjustments for the expenses of the fund manager
Under the risk control schemes the expenses of the fundman-
ager are adjusted as follows: For a long position under the Basle
II scheme
f (T ) =
T∑
i=0
Mh(i)S , (34)
and in the perfect hedge case
f (T ) =
T∑
i=0
Dh(i)Ph(i). (35)
Expenses of fund managers for short positions are calculated in
a similar way as described in section 3.1.3 and 3.2.2.
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